The Incoherence of the Philiosphers (2)
AL-GHAZLI CITED ON JIHADIST VIDEO
I see that an American jihadist has issued a video in which he mentions "the incoherence" of the doctrines in the West. If you wanted to be as shallow as he is, you could say "what could be more incoherent than Sunni Moslems blowing up Shia Moslem shrines as is happening in Iraq? or Arab Moslems commiting a genocide against African Moslems as is happening in Darfur?"
But it's more interesting to me that he mentions "The Incoherence". It makes this philosophical discussion seem ... relevant? timely? The Incoherence of the Philosophers in banned in Turkey because the book is connected in Islamic history with the decision to turn away from free discussion inside Islam. Many sites which discuss Al-Ghazli bring this up. In my opinion he would never have called for a turning from free discussion and the sections being quoted today make that particularly plain.
Al-Ghazli may have shown "the incoherence of the philosophers" as of his day. He never would have said that there was no point in reading or discussing philosophers now that he had shown their errors. In today's sections he specifically limits his discussion to the narrow set of issues where there is substantial and significant disagreement between Avicenna (and Aristotle) and religion. This leaves a wide area for discussion and Al-Ghazli was quite definite that religion should not be intruded into this area by excitable, ignorant defenders of Islam. He would not have decided it was time for an end to free discussion.
If the Islamists come to power in Turkey - or elsewhere - they may try to suppress free discussion citing Al-Ghazli. Then readers of this site will be able to instantly reply: Do not try to advance the cause of religion by increasing ignorance for did not Al-Ghazli say “a rational foe is better than an ignorant friend." '
TODAY'S SECTIONS
In today's sections Al-Ghazli is discussing how he will refute the philosophers. These sections are called Introductions but they are quite important because in them Al-Ghazli marks out boundaries between philosophy (and science since the two were bound together in Avicenna's work)and religion. He points out several ways in which unnecessary conflicts arise: namely, poor translations, purely verbal disputes, disputes over points irrelevant to religion, disputes caused by someone insisting that philosophy has challenged Muhammed's words. He is very hard on this last practice, saying: "The harm inflicted on religion by those who defend it not by its proper way is greater than the harm caused by those who attack it in the way proper to it. As it has been said: “a rational foe is better than an ignorant friend.”
He points out that Muhammad's words words must be distinguished from comments on those words and from poor translations. Then too, the words might be metaphorical. When Muhammd is cited as an authority all these points must be kept in mind.
Current jihadists who think Al-Ghazli would support their melding of Islam with an easy ignorance buttressed by a solid dose of hatred, cruelty and lies, are very wrong.
I remind readers that I have removed parentheses inserted by translators and spelled out references - i.e. "they" has been changed to "the followers of Avicenna" or "the Greek philosophers"
INTRODUCTION (CONTINUED PREVIOUS POST)
Al-Ghazli makes a definite statement about Avicenna's physics and metaphysics, a challenge to his followers. He says Aristotle, Avicenna and other philosophers are using "supposition and surmise without verification and certainty." The weak-minded assume after reading these philosophers on mathematics that their physics and metaphysics must be equally demonstrable. Not so says Al-Ghazli. If their metaphysics was as well founded as their mathematics they would all agree as they do about mathematics whereas in fact they disagree. A point to keep in mind is that Aristotle and Avicenna asserted the eternity of the world whereas the Old Testament and Koran asserted "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
I, Al-Ghazli, teacher in Islam, have transmitted this story to let it be known that there is neither firm foundation nor perfection in the doctrine Aristotle and Avicenna's followers hold which opposes Islam; that they judge in terms of supposition and surmise, without verification or certainty; that they use the appearance of their mathematical and logical sciences as evidential proof for the truth of their physical and metaphysical sciences, using this as a gradual enticement for the weak in mind. Had the physical and metaphysical sciences of Aristotle, Avicenna and their followers been as perfect in demonstration, free from conjecture, as their mathematical, they would not have disagreed among themselves regarding physics and metaphysics, just as they have not disagreed in their mathematical sciences.
WE ONLY KNOW ARISTOTLE IN TRANSLATION AND THIS TOO HAS LED TO DISPUTES AMONG THE FOLLOWERS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS WHICH THERE IS NO NEED TO DELVE INTO. WE WILL DISCUSS WHAT AVICENNA AND AL-FARABI, THE MOST IMPORTANT ISLAMIC FOLLOWERS OF ARISOTLE'S ERRORS, HAVE SAID.
We only know Aristotle in translation and this too has led to disputes among the followers of the philosophers which there is no need to delve into. We will discuss what Avicenna and Al-Farabi, the most important Islamic followers of Arisotle's errors, have said.
Moreover, the words of the translators of the words of Aristotle are not free from corruption and change, requiring exegesis and interpretation, so that this also has aroused conflict among them. The most reliable transmitters and verifiers among the philosophers in islam are Al-Farabi Abu Nasr and Avicenna. Let us then confine ourselves to refuting what these two have selected and deemed true of the doctrines of their leaders in error. For what they have abandoned and scorned to pursue no one contests is error and needs no lengthy examination to refute. Let it then be known that we are confining ourselves to the Greek philosophers’ doctrines according to the transmission of these two men so that the discussion would not spread far and wide - as far and wide as the spread of Greek philosophy.
A Second Introduction
There are three parts to the dispute among philosophers. These parts have led to sects among them.
Let it be known, then, that the dispute between the philosophers and others of their sects has three parts.
There is a part which is concerned with disputes which are purely verbal even though the issue is important. For instance, Avicenna and Al-Farabi say the world's creator is a substance by which they mean self subsisting and non-material through others use this word to mean material and not self-subsisting, i.e., occupies space.
There is a part in which the dispute reduces to the purely verbal, as, for example, their naming the world’s Creator -exalted be He above what they say- a substance, with their explanation of [this] substance as that which does not exist in a subject, that is as the self-subsisting that does not need something else which substantiates it. They did not intend by this substance, as their opponents intend, that which occupies space.
We as philosophers will not get into this kind of verbal dispute. It may be that a usage by a philosopher is unprecedented and not sanctioned by the lawyers. This is a problem in theocratic state. "You must not, however, allow the true nature of things to become confused for you because of customs and formalities." It is a question about saying in controversial way something that is true. Questions about the use of words can be investigated freely (by others) because it is just like asking whether a certain act is acceptable under religious law. But bogging down on the use of words is not relevant to our philosophical quest. This how we should look at disputes of the first "part" or type.
We will not plunge into a refutation of this because once the meaning of self-subsistence becomes agreed upon, then the discussion regarding the use of the term “substance” to express this meaning becomes a lexical investigation. If language sanctions its use, then the permissibility of its use in religion reverts to investigations within the religious law. For the prohibiting and permitting of terms derives from what the outer meaning of the religious texts indicates. Now, you may say that this type of naming has been mentioned by the theologians in relation to the divine attributes but was not introduced by the lawyers in the discipline of the religious law. You must not, however, allow the true nature of things to become confused for you because of customs and formalities. For you now know that it is an investigation about the permissibility of uttering an expression whose meaning is true of the thing named. It is thus similar to investigating the permissibility of a certain act-hence within the province of the religious law.
The second part of the dispute among philosphers is concerned with issues that are more than verbal but are not relevant to the principles of religion. An example of this is the statement that the earth is round and that this is the cause of eclipses.
The second part of the dispute of the philosophers is the part in which their doctrine does not clash with any religious principle and where it is not a necessity of the belief in the prophets and God’s messengers, God’s prayers be upon them, to dispute with the philosophers about it. An example of this is their statement: “the lunar eclipse consists in the obliteration of the moon’s light due to the interposition of the earth between it and the sun, the earth being a sphere surrounded by the sky on all sides. Thus when the moon falls in the earth’s shadow, the sun’s light is severed from it.” Another example is their statement: “the solar eclipse means the presence of the lunar orb between the observer and the sun. This occurs when the sun and the moon are both at the two nodes at one degree.”
We should not try to refute these theories. It is not a religious duty and as a matter of fact it harms religion. When someone who knows something by geometrical or mathematical proofs is told that his knowledge is contrary to religion, he does not think his proofs are wrong, he thinks religion is wrong. Defending religion illogically is more harmful than attacking it logically. “a rational foe is better than an ignorant friend.”
This topic is also one into the refutation of which we shall not plunge, since this serves no purpose. Whoever thinks that to engage in a disputation for refuting such a theory is a religious duty harms religion and weakens it. For these matters rest on demonstrations, geometrical and arithmetical, that leave no room for doubt. Thus when one who studies these demonstrations and ascertains their proofs, deriving thereby information about the time of the two eclipses and their extent and duration, when this someone is told that this is contrary to religion, that individual will not suspect his proofs, he will only suspect religion. The harm inflicted on religion by those who defend it not by its proper way is greater than the harm caused by those who attack it in the way proper to it. As it has been said: “a rational foe is better than an ignorant friend.”
Suppose someone challenges you on an issue like that of the eclipses by saying that you are contradicting Muhammed. What follows shows how to handle this kind of challenge.
If it is said by a religious believer who thinks the philosophers must be refuted about the nature of eclipses that God’s messenger Muhammed (God’s prayers and peace be upon him) said, “The sun and moon are two of God’s signs that are eclipsed neither for the death nor the life of anyone; should you witness such events, then hasten to the remembrance of God and prayer.” how, then, does this agree with what the philosophers state?"
The answer in this particular case is that Muhammed said that an eclipse was not a sign of the life or death of anyone but to pray when it occurs. This does not contradict the argument that eclipses are caused by the earth being a sphere. Some say that revelation says that an eclipse is a miracle as indicated by “but if God reveals himself to a thing it submits itself to him,”
We say: There is nothing in what Muhammad said that contradicts what the philosophers have stated about eclipses since there is nothing in what Muhammad said except the denial of the occurrence of the eclipse for the death or life of anyone and the command to pray when it occurs. Why should it be so farfetched for the religious law that commands prayer at noon and sunset to command, as recommendable, prayer at the occurrence of an eclipse? If the religious believer responds that at the end of this saying, Muhammad said, “But if God reveals Himself to a thing it submits itself to Him,” and the religious believer says this proves that the eclipse is submission by reason of revelation, we answer:
The answer is to point out that this second saying has a questionable place in the canon of Muhammad's sayings, the true saying being the one Al-Ghazli cited first. And if on some other occasion the saying were truly part of the Koran, it should be seen as metaphorical like many other sayings. This is how to handle disputes of the second type or part. There is nothing atheists like better than to have a rejection of a clear demonstration like the proof that eclipses are caused by the spherical nature of the earth made into a religious requirement. It makes refuting religion easy for them.
This addition is not soundly transmitted and hence the one who transmits it must be ruled as conveying what is false. The correctly related tradition is the one we have mentioned. How is this not so? And if the transmission of the addition were sound, then it would be easier to interpret it metaphorically rather than reject matters that are conclusively true. For how many an apparent scriptural meaning has been interpreted metaphorically on the basis of rational proofs rejecting their literal sense that do not attain the degree of clarity of the astronomical demonstrations regarding the eclipse! The greatest thing the atheists rejoice in is for the defender of religion to declare that these astronomical demonstrations and their like are contrary to religion. Thus the atheist’s path for refuting religion becomes easy if the likes of the above argument are rendered a condition for its truth.
All that matters is the question of whether the world is god's act and whether it originated in time or is eternal - how eclipses happen, whether the universe is an octagon, a hexagon or a sphere, whether in thirteen layers or more or less is about as important to the religious question as how many layers an onion has or how many seeds there are in a pomegranate. So sort all questions into one of the three kinds and do not hold religious disputes about the first two, only the third.
This is because the inquiry at issue for religion about the world is whether the world originated in time or is eternal. Moreover, once its temporal origination is established, it makes no difference whether it is a sphere, a simple body, an octagon, a hexagon; no difference whether the highest heaven and what is beneath them are thirteen layers, as they say, or lesser or greater. For the relation of the inquiry into these matters to the inquiry into divine matters is similar to the relation of looking at the number of layers of an onion or the number of seeds in a pomegranate. What is matters is only the world’s being God’s act, whatever mode it has.
The third type of question or third part of the dispute the philosophers have is the type of question that does touch the principles of religion. These include the doctrine of Creation from nothingness and of the resurrection of the body and other equally important principles which Avicenna and his followers have denied. Here the philosophers must be shown to be false using principles they acknowledge.
The third part is one where the dispute pertains to one of the principles of religion, such as upholding the doctrine of the world’s origination and of the positive attributes of the Creator, or demonstrating the resurrection of bodies, all of which the philosophers have denied. It is in this topic and its likes, not any other, that one must show the falsity of their doctrine.
A Third Introduction
How is it best to carry on this third kind of dispute? WhatAl-Ghazli will do is show those who think the philosophers are free of contradictions that Avicenna and his followers, are full of contradictions and are incoherent. Sometimes they are Sunnis, sometimes Shiites. He does not propose a physics or a metaphysics of his own but challenges them on their own ground using their own principles.
Let it be known that our objective is to alert those who think well of the philosophers and believe that their ways are free from contradiction.
For this reason, I do not enter into argument objecting to the philosophers, except as one who demands and denies, not as one who claims and affirms. I will render murky what Avicenna's followers believe in by showing conclusively that they must hold to contradictory and varying consequences of their theories. Thus I will force on them at one time necessary adherence to Mu‘tazilite doctrine, at another to that of the Karramiyya, at yet another to that of the Waqifiyya. I, however, will not rise to the defense of any one doctrine, but will make all the islamic sects as one group against the followers of the philosophers. For islamic sects differ in matters of detail, whereas these philosophers and their followers challenge the very principles of religion. Let all believers in Islam then strive against them. For in the face of hardships rancors depart.
I see that an American jihadist has issued a video in which he mentions "the incoherence" of the doctrines in the West. If you wanted to be as shallow as he is, you could say "what could be more incoherent than Sunni Moslems blowing up Shia Moslem shrines as is happening in Iraq? or Arab Moslems commiting a genocide against African Moslems as is happening in Darfur?"
But it's more interesting to me that he mentions "The Incoherence". It makes this philosophical discussion seem ... relevant? timely? The Incoherence of the Philosophers in banned in Turkey because the book is connected in Islamic history with the decision to turn away from free discussion inside Islam. Many sites which discuss Al-Ghazli bring this up. In my opinion he would never have called for a turning from free discussion and the sections being quoted today make that particularly plain.
Al-Ghazli may have shown "the incoherence of the philosophers" as of his day. He never would have said that there was no point in reading or discussing philosophers now that he had shown their errors. In today's sections he specifically limits his discussion to the narrow set of issues where there is substantial and significant disagreement between Avicenna (and Aristotle) and religion. This leaves a wide area for discussion and Al-Ghazli was quite definite that religion should not be intruded into this area by excitable, ignorant defenders of Islam. He would not have decided it was time for an end to free discussion.
If the Islamists come to power in Turkey - or elsewhere - they may try to suppress free discussion citing Al-Ghazli. Then readers of this site will be able to instantly reply: Do not try to advance the cause of religion by increasing ignorance for did not Al-Ghazli say “a rational foe is better than an ignorant friend." '
TODAY'S SECTIONS
In today's sections Al-Ghazli is discussing how he will refute the philosophers. These sections are called Introductions but they are quite important because in them Al-Ghazli marks out boundaries between philosophy (and science since the two were bound together in Avicenna's work)and religion. He points out several ways in which unnecessary conflicts arise: namely, poor translations, purely verbal disputes, disputes over points irrelevant to religion, disputes caused by someone insisting that philosophy has challenged Muhammed's words. He is very hard on this last practice, saying: "The harm inflicted on religion by those who defend it not by its proper way is greater than the harm caused by those who attack it in the way proper to it. As it has been said: “a rational foe is better than an ignorant friend.”
He points out that Muhammad's words words must be distinguished from comments on those words and from poor translations. Then too, the words might be metaphorical. When Muhammd is cited as an authority all these points must be kept in mind.
Current jihadists who think Al-Ghazli would support their melding of Islam with an easy ignorance buttressed by a solid dose of hatred, cruelty and lies, are very wrong.
I remind readers that I have removed parentheses inserted by translators and spelled out references - i.e. "they" has been changed to "the followers of Avicenna" or "the Greek philosophers"
INTRODUCTION (CONTINUED PREVIOUS POST)
Al-Ghazli makes a definite statement about Avicenna's physics and metaphysics, a challenge to his followers. He says Aristotle, Avicenna and other philosophers are using "supposition and surmise without verification and certainty." The weak-minded assume after reading these philosophers on mathematics that their physics and metaphysics must be equally demonstrable. Not so says Al-Ghazli. If their metaphysics was as well founded as their mathematics they would all agree as they do about mathematics whereas in fact they disagree. A point to keep in mind is that Aristotle and Avicenna asserted the eternity of the world whereas the Old Testament and Koran asserted "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."
I, Al-Ghazli, teacher in Islam, have transmitted this story to let it be known that there is neither firm foundation nor perfection in the doctrine Aristotle and Avicenna's followers hold which opposes Islam; that they judge in terms of supposition and surmise, without verification or certainty; that they use the appearance of their mathematical and logical sciences as evidential proof for the truth of their physical and metaphysical sciences, using this as a gradual enticement for the weak in mind. Had the physical and metaphysical sciences of Aristotle, Avicenna and their followers been as perfect in demonstration, free from conjecture, as their mathematical, they would not have disagreed among themselves regarding physics and metaphysics, just as they have not disagreed in their mathematical sciences.
WE ONLY KNOW ARISTOTLE IN TRANSLATION AND THIS TOO HAS LED TO DISPUTES AMONG THE FOLLOWERS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS WHICH THERE IS NO NEED TO DELVE INTO. WE WILL DISCUSS WHAT AVICENNA AND AL-FARABI, THE MOST IMPORTANT ISLAMIC FOLLOWERS OF ARISOTLE'S ERRORS, HAVE SAID.
We only know Aristotle in translation and this too has led to disputes among the followers of the philosophers which there is no need to delve into. We will discuss what Avicenna and Al-Farabi, the most important Islamic followers of Arisotle's errors, have said.
Moreover, the words of the translators of the words of Aristotle are not free from corruption and change, requiring exegesis and interpretation, so that this also has aroused conflict among them. The most reliable transmitters and verifiers among the philosophers in islam are Al-Farabi Abu Nasr and Avicenna. Let us then confine ourselves to refuting what these two have selected and deemed true of the doctrines of their leaders in error. For what they have abandoned and scorned to pursue no one contests is error and needs no lengthy examination to refute. Let it then be known that we are confining ourselves to the Greek philosophers’ doctrines according to the transmission of these two men so that the discussion would not spread far and wide - as far and wide as the spread of Greek philosophy.
A Second Introduction
There are three parts to the dispute among philosophers. These parts have led to sects among them.
Let it be known, then, that the dispute between the philosophers and others of their sects has three parts.
There is a part which is concerned with disputes which are purely verbal even though the issue is important. For instance, Avicenna and Al-Farabi say the world's creator is a substance by which they mean self subsisting and non-material through others use this word to mean material and not self-subsisting, i.e., occupies space.
There is a part in which the dispute reduces to the purely verbal, as, for example, their naming the world’s Creator -exalted be He above what they say- a substance, with their explanation of [this] substance as that which does not exist in a subject, that is as the self-subsisting that does not need something else which substantiates it. They did not intend by this substance, as their opponents intend, that which occupies space.
We as philosophers will not get into this kind of verbal dispute. It may be that a usage by a philosopher is unprecedented and not sanctioned by the lawyers. This is a problem in theocratic state. "You must not, however, allow the true nature of things to become confused for you because of customs and formalities." It is a question about saying in controversial way something that is true. Questions about the use of words can be investigated freely (by others) because it is just like asking whether a certain act is acceptable under religious law. But bogging down on the use of words is not relevant to our philosophical quest. This how we should look at disputes of the first "part" or type.
We will not plunge into a refutation of this because once the meaning of self-subsistence becomes agreed upon, then the discussion regarding the use of the term “substance” to express this meaning becomes a lexical investigation. If language sanctions its use, then the permissibility of its use in religion reverts to investigations within the religious law. For the prohibiting and permitting of terms derives from what the outer meaning of the religious texts indicates. Now, you may say that this type of naming has been mentioned by the theologians in relation to the divine attributes but was not introduced by the lawyers in the discipline of the religious law. You must not, however, allow the true nature of things to become confused for you because of customs and formalities. For you now know that it is an investigation about the permissibility of uttering an expression whose meaning is true of the thing named. It is thus similar to investigating the permissibility of a certain act-hence within the province of the religious law.
The second part of the dispute among philosphers is concerned with issues that are more than verbal but are not relevant to the principles of religion. An example of this is the statement that the earth is round and that this is the cause of eclipses.
The second part of the dispute of the philosophers is the part in which their doctrine does not clash with any religious principle and where it is not a necessity of the belief in the prophets and God’s messengers, God’s prayers be upon them, to dispute with the philosophers about it. An example of this is their statement: “the lunar eclipse consists in the obliteration of the moon’s light due to the interposition of the earth between it and the sun, the earth being a sphere surrounded by the sky on all sides. Thus when the moon falls in the earth’s shadow, the sun’s light is severed from it.” Another example is their statement: “the solar eclipse means the presence of the lunar orb between the observer and the sun. This occurs when the sun and the moon are both at the two nodes at one degree.”
We should not try to refute these theories. It is not a religious duty and as a matter of fact it harms religion. When someone who knows something by geometrical or mathematical proofs is told that his knowledge is contrary to religion, he does not think his proofs are wrong, he thinks religion is wrong. Defending religion illogically is more harmful than attacking it logically. “a rational foe is better than an ignorant friend.”
This topic is also one into the refutation of which we shall not plunge, since this serves no purpose. Whoever thinks that to engage in a disputation for refuting such a theory is a religious duty harms religion and weakens it. For these matters rest on demonstrations, geometrical and arithmetical, that leave no room for doubt. Thus when one who studies these demonstrations and ascertains their proofs, deriving thereby information about the time of the two eclipses and their extent and duration, when this someone is told that this is contrary to religion, that individual will not suspect his proofs, he will only suspect religion. The harm inflicted on religion by those who defend it not by its proper way is greater than the harm caused by those who attack it in the way proper to it. As it has been said: “a rational foe is better than an ignorant friend.”
Suppose someone challenges you on an issue like that of the eclipses by saying that you are contradicting Muhammed. What follows shows how to handle this kind of challenge.
If it is said by a religious believer who thinks the philosophers must be refuted about the nature of eclipses that God’s messenger Muhammed (God’s prayers and peace be upon him) said, “The sun and moon are two of God’s signs that are eclipsed neither for the death nor the life of anyone; should you witness such events, then hasten to the remembrance of God and prayer.” how, then, does this agree with what the philosophers state?"
The answer in this particular case is that Muhammed said that an eclipse was not a sign of the life or death of anyone but to pray when it occurs. This does not contradict the argument that eclipses are caused by the earth being a sphere. Some say that revelation says that an eclipse is a miracle as indicated by “but if God reveals himself to a thing it submits itself to him,”
We say: There is nothing in what Muhammad said that contradicts what the philosophers have stated about eclipses since there is nothing in what Muhammad said except the denial of the occurrence of the eclipse for the death or life of anyone and the command to pray when it occurs. Why should it be so farfetched for the religious law that commands prayer at noon and sunset to command, as recommendable, prayer at the occurrence of an eclipse? If the religious believer responds that at the end of this saying, Muhammad said, “But if God reveals Himself to a thing it submits itself to Him,” and the religious believer says this proves that the eclipse is submission by reason of revelation, we answer:
The answer is to point out that this second saying has a questionable place in the canon of Muhammad's sayings, the true saying being the one Al-Ghazli cited first. And if on some other occasion the saying were truly part of the Koran, it should be seen as metaphorical like many other sayings. This is how to handle disputes of the second type or part. There is nothing atheists like better than to have a rejection of a clear demonstration like the proof that eclipses are caused by the spherical nature of the earth made into a religious requirement. It makes refuting religion easy for them.
This addition is not soundly transmitted and hence the one who transmits it must be ruled as conveying what is false. The correctly related tradition is the one we have mentioned. How is this not so? And if the transmission of the addition were sound, then it would be easier to interpret it metaphorically rather than reject matters that are conclusively true. For how many an apparent scriptural meaning has been interpreted metaphorically on the basis of rational proofs rejecting their literal sense that do not attain the degree of clarity of the astronomical demonstrations regarding the eclipse! The greatest thing the atheists rejoice in is for the defender of religion to declare that these astronomical demonstrations and their like are contrary to religion. Thus the atheist’s path for refuting religion becomes easy if the likes of the above argument are rendered a condition for its truth.
All that matters is the question of whether the world is god's act and whether it originated in time or is eternal - how eclipses happen, whether the universe is an octagon, a hexagon or a sphere, whether in thirteen layers or more or less is about as important to the religious question as how many layers an onion has or how many seeds there are in a pomegranate. So sort all questions into one of the three kinds and do not hold religious disputes about the first two, only the third.
This is because the inquiry at issue for religion about the world is whether the world originated in time or is eternal. Moreover, once its temporal origination is established, it makes no difference whether it is a sphere, a simple body, an octagon, a hexagon; no difference whether the highest heaven and what is beneath them are thirteen layers, as they say, or lesser or greater. For the relation of the inquiry into these matters to the inquiry into divine matters is similar to the relation of looking at the number of layers of an onion or the number of seeds in a pomegranate. What is matters is only the world’s being God’s act, whatever mode it has.
The third type of question or third part of the dispute the philosophers have is the type of question that does touch the principles of religion. These include the doctrine of Creation from nothingness and of the resurrection of the body and other equally important principles which Avicenna and his followers have denied. Here the philosophers must be shown to be false using principles they acknowledge.
The third part is one where the dispute pertains to one of the principles of religion, such as upholding the doctrine of the world’s origination and of the positive attributes of the Creator, or demonstrating the resurrection of bodies, all of which the philosophers have denied. It is in this topic and its likes, not any other, that one must show the falsity of their doctrine.
A Third Introduction
How is it best to carry on this third kind of dispute? WhatAl-Ghazli will do is show those who think the philosophers are free of contradictions that Avicenna and his followers, are full of contradictions and are incoherent. Sometimes they are Sunnis, sometimes Shiites. He does not propose a physics or a metaphysics of his own but challenges them on their own ground using their own principles.
Let it be known that our objective is to alert those who think well of the philosophers and believe that their ways are free from contradiction.
For this reason, I do not enter into argument objecting to the philosophers, except as one who demands and denies, not as one who claims and affirms. I will render murky what Avicenna's followers believe in by showing conclusively that they must hold to contradictory and varying consequences of their theories. Thus I will force on them at one time necessary adherence to Mu‘tazilite doctrine, at another to that of the Karramiyya, at yet another to that of the Waqifiyya. I, however, will not rise to the defense of any one doctrine, but will make all the islamic sects as one group against the followers of the philosophers. For islamic sects differ in matters of detail, whereas these philosophers and their followers challenge the very principles of religion. Let all believers in Islam then strive against them. For in the face of hardships rancors depart.
posted by wildswan at 9/10/2006 10:47:00 AM
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